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PASCN Discussion Paper No. 99-05

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

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March 1999

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The Great Dragon Effect: Whose Lunch is Mainland China Eating?

Raul V. Fabella*

I. Introduction

The currency turmoil in East Asia has spawned a bubble market for explanatory frameworks and frenzied attempts at some handle and understanding. How the erst-while Asean economic miracles metamorphosed overnight into IMF wards is an epic whose plotlines are still being written. The Krugman-Young 'all brawn and no brain" advocates claim they have something to say. The "core-periphery thesis" is thrown straws to grasp at. Conspiracy and dependency advocates have been thrown a lifeline. The Marxist and self-appointed progressives are salivating at the prospect of a revival. The orthodox "domestic financial policy mistakes" view championed by the IMF and the WB still rule the roost.

This paper wonders whether Mainland China had a role in this crisis. The question it addresses is best posed by Goldman Sach's Hu (1997) "Did Mainland China eat East Asia's lunch?" His answer is "no." Is it then just a mere coincidence that the East Asian crisis came in the wake of the Chinese devaluation in 1995; that every economy in East Asia has yielded businesses and factories to China; that China's share in DFI ballooned out of proportion in the early 90's?

II. Li Peng and the Chinese Strong State

When Li Peng, Premier of the People's Republic of China, visited Singapore in end of August 1997, we saw glimpses of what Mainland China is up to. In an interview, he said addressing prospective foreign investors; "We just want to guide your invest-ments; to remind you at the beginning that your products should be geared for export." (PDI, August 27, 1997) He was addressing queries about the possible lifting of rather onerous rules binding on foreign investors:

(a) limiting to 10-20% the output of foreign investment that can be sold in the local market;
(b) setting the deadline for turnover of ownership to Chinese partner to 10-15 years.

He continued: "We still give exceptional waivers for high-tech projects, projects we need and projects that are globally competitive." Finally, he warned that China appre-ciates "less and less (investment) in real estate where we have surplus capacity . . ."

If Li Peng's interview represents the dominant economic posture of the Chinese leadership, it can only add to the already considerable anxiety among its neighbors

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about China's intention. The reason is that (a) the posture is correct by orthodox economic reckoning -- pick and choose your DFI's to boost world competitiveness and reject carpetbaggers and (b) China attracts a lot of DFI's which it then marshalls to raise exports -- the root, in the eyes of many, of the East Asian miracles. China's undisguised "mercantilism" is not reassuring.

East Asia's and especially the Asean's anxiety about China is well-founded:

(i) The penetration of Chinese goods of Asian and Asean domestic markets is rising at alarming rates. (see Section VI)

(ii) Instances of Asean domestic companies closing shop due partly or largely to Chinese competition are frequent and numerous.

(iii) Instances of factories relocating to Mainland China are well known and well publicized.

(iv) The considerable Chinese devaluation of its currency in January 1994, effected without fanfare or pressure, told of a single-minded monetary authority that can respond quickly to adverse developments, in this case, a burgeoning trade deficit. The trade deficit promptly reversed and by 1996 was a considerable surplus. Whipping inflation from an average of 25% in early 90's, single digit in the mid-90's only added to this lustre.

(v) The Tiananmen Square Massacre and the peaceful reversion of Hongkong (only 5 years after the loathing inspired by Tiananmen) told of a political core that can be ruthless when threatened and flexible when its interests so dictate.

Because of its extreme past, its economic perestroika attracts the support of financially muscled overseas Chinese.

Here is a "strong state" if ever there was one, so reminiscent of Taiwan under Chiang Kai Shek, South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Singapore under Lee Kwan Yew.

(vi) The reversion of Hongkong to China means that Hongkong's financial muscle will be ever more dedicated to China's potential.

Here was Li Peng's interview which reveals that this political core is not only "strong," it is also "developmental." The peaceful and uneventful passing of the baton from Premier Deng to Premier Jiang, usually the waterloo of strong states, reinforced the core's claim to legitimacy erasing any doubts about the regime's survivability. This amalgam of a strong political core, continuity and developmental bias is usually associated with spectacular economic performance. And so it has been in the last 5 years. Table 1 shows the growth rates of real GDP and sectoral production in China. China's dominance in growth performance is unchallenged even by East Asia. Its production structure especially the share of Manufacturing (38%) resembles Taiwan and S. Korea in the 80's. In production share, Mainland China is the true inheritor of the tiger economy mantle passing from Japan to Taiwan and South Korea rather than Asean.

More than anything, it is the last amalgam that sends spine shivers throughout East Asia on the Chinese challenge. India is also a large country but is always teeter-

ing on indecision and policy reversals and contradiction. It is not possessed of that singleness of purpose that we see in China. Nor does India have the backing of an equally affluent overseas ethnic brethren.

Table 1. China's Growth Performance and Structure in Perspective (1990-1995)

	China	East Asia	South Asia	Latin America
A. Growth (Annual Average)				
GDP	12.8	10.3	4.6	3.2
Agriculture	4.3	3.9	3.0	2.3
Industry	18.1	15.0	5.3	2.5
Services	10.0	8.4	6.0	3.8
Exports	15.6	13.9	11.9	7.0
GDI	15.5	14.4	5.3	5.7
B. Production Structure: Share in GDP				
Agriculture	21	18	30	10
Industry	48	44	27	33
Manufacturing	38	32	17	21
Services	31	38	41	55

Source: World Bank Development Report, 1997

III. The Great Dragon Effect

The East Asian landscape may be witnessing a "great dragon effect." We know the exploits of the dragon economies (a.k.a. tiger economies, or miracle economies). Not too many people realize, however, that the success of the small dragon economies in the 70's and the 90's cannot be divorced from the growth and maturation of the samurai economy, Japan. As the Japanese economy matured in the 70's with rapidly rising labor cost, Japan relegated to Taiwan, S. Korea and Singapore its light manufactures. It provided the intermediate inputs with which these economies mounted their first meaningful assault on the world market. Thus could S. Korea argue and with reason that its trade surplus with the US (which was resented) was disguised Japanese surplus with the US since S. Korea maintained a huge trade deficit with Japan. With Singapore, S. Korea and Taiwan, Japan was an indirect big brother in the finest flying geese tradition.

With the Asean, the Japanese embrace tightened. It was Japanese direct foreign investment itself that spawned the miracles. Japan was losing comparative advantage in end-stage electronics assembly in the 80's and found the Asean a congenial place to relocate its factories. The great export stride of the Asean three (Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) is unthinkable apart from Japanese DFI. As enormous and advanced Japan caught up rapidly with the West, it pulled along the Asean whose endowments, aspirations and political postures were complementary with Japan's. Mahathir's "look east policy" fitted the framework perfectly. The result, Asean economies moved into high gear. In the 80's, the "Yen Block" was the co-prosperity sphere.

This I will call the "complementary Great Dragon effect," with Japan as the great dragon.

China's emergence by contrast threatens a "substitutive Great Dragon effect." This enormous Chinese economy is, in per capita terms, below the Asean economies. Its potential is vast and proven. Its political economy and its economic posture (nominally "market Socialism") is mercantilistic and biased towards exports (note the Li Peng interview above). As it carves its place in the export market, it will necessarily step on many toes in the Asean since its abundant endowment (huge labor pool) rivals and even dwarfs that of the Asean. Its comparative advantage lies parallel to that of many Asean economies.

Had export-smitten China not been there, the flying geese process of relegation of labor intensive products by the NICs (S. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan) to more labor abundant Asean (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines) would have continued smoothly into the 90's, just as Japan relegated these to Taiwan, S. Korea and Singapore in the 70's. The entry of China altered the posture. China has no peer in labor abundance. Thus, the process shifted sharply towards China before the process is completed in the Asean.

China competes head-to-head with the Asean in direct foreign investment and has virtually won this battle (see Section IV). Because of its unabashed export-biased policies on DFI's, one which the individual Asean country does not employ due to lack of bargaining power, these huge resources are trained towards wresting market share from the Asean and others. Textiles, footwear, toys, plastic products have all been swallowed up by China using Taiwan, Singapore and Hongkong capital. To put it another way, China has allowed the more advanced NICs to hold on to production activities that have lost comparative advantage in their domestic grounds longer than had relocated to costlier Asean. Thus, the fateful relegation process towards the Asean is being aborted or at least dissipated.

How the individual Asean economies will fare depends upon their factor endowments. Those whose factor endowments compete directly with China will lose (i.e., their lunch will be eaten); those whose factor endowments are complementary, i.e., whose primary and industrial raw materials will be needed by China's growth and export drive, will prosper.

These required raw materials will come in two forms: (i) primary commodities like lumber, petroleum and metals and (ii) intermediate industrial inputs. S. Korea and Taiwan will gain by China's emergence being sources of the latter. It will hasten Taiwan's and South Korea's ascent of the value-added ladder. They will sit down with China to break bread they filch from other economies. Indonesia and Malaysia are great traditional sources of the primary raw materials and they too will, for a while, gain. But in the longer run, their export drives may hit the shallows. For example, Japan is a market almost exclusively penetrated by Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand among LDCs. This is due to Japanese MNCs operating in the Asean countries and producing for the Japanese home economy. But these same firms (Matsushita, Sony, National, Minibea) all have factories in China where outputs will soon dwarf those in Asean. How long will Japan be an Asean preserve is a big question. Already, "Made

in China" labels are appearing in Japanese outlets. Unfortunately, the Philippines and Thailand are the two countries that lie squarely in the path of this Great Dragon. Thailand has an ace. Thailand is a world class player in rice and food production. China's requirement for rice will rise. The Philippines is less fortunate. It will be lucky if it only loses its lunch.

IV. DFI's and China

China in the 90's is the great attractor of direct foreign investment. Table 2 shows the inflows of DFI's into Asian and Latin America from 1990 to 1995. China moves from a modest $3.5 B in 1990 to $37.7 B in 1995. By contrast, all of Latin America moved from $5.9 B in 1990 to $14.8 B. Singapore, the second highest has only $6.9 B while Indonesia $4.5 B. Table 3 gives the country shares in DFI into Asia. China moves from 19.84% in 1990 to 61% in 1995. The shares of other East Asian countries all fell from their 1990 level by 1995 except Indonesia. Clearly, China is winning the DFI battle hands down. Fortunately, the shrinking shares is in the background of rapid growth in total DFI's. Table 4 give the country shares in world DFI's. China moved from 1.51% to 12%. Only Indonesia and Malaysia show an increase. All the rest experienced reduced shares. China took away not only from East Asian neighbours but from other LDCs elsewhere.

Even granting that the presence of China itself increased DFI flows in the 90's, the rapidity of the rise in its share is unlikely to occur without other East Asians losing. Note, however, that all East Asia including the Philippines experienced rapid rise in absolute levels of DFI's in the period.

Table 2. FDI Inflow into Asia and Latin America (BOP based, $ million)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Asia	17,579	19,742	24,267	43,758	50,865	61,829
Republic of Korea	788	1,180	727	588	809	1,776
Taiwan	1,330	1,271	879	917	1,375	1,559
Singapore	5,575	4,887	2,204	4,686	5,480	6,912
Thailand	2,444	2,014	2,113	1,804	1,366	2,068
Malaysia	2,332	3,998	5,183	5,006	4,348	5,800
Philippines	530	544	228	1,238	1,591	1,478
Indonesia	1,093	1,482	1,777	2,004	2,109	4,500
China	3,487	4,366	11,156	27,515	33,787	37,736
Latin America	5,964	8,807	9,708	9,972	16,420	14,836

Source: Jetro White Paper on FDI, 1997

Table 3. Shares in FDI into Asia (in percent)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Asia	100	100	100	100	100	100
Republic of Korea	4.48	5.98	3.00	1.34	1.59	2.87
Taiwan	7.57	6.44	3.62	2.10	2.70	2.52
Singapore	31.71	24.75	9.08	10.71	10.77	11.18
Thailand	13.90	10.20	8.71	4.12	2.69	3.34
Malaysia	13.27	20.25	21.36	11.44	8.55	9.38
Philippines	3.01	2.76	.94	2.83	3.13	2.39
Indonesia	6.22	7.51	7.32	4.58	4.15	7.28
China	19.84	22.11	45.97	62.88	66.42	61.03

Source of Raw Data: Jetro White Paper on FDI, 1997

Table 4. Shares of Asia and Latin America in World FDI (in percent).

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Asia	7.62	10.29	12.98	18.80	20.56	19.48
Republic of Korea	.34	.61	.39	.25	.33	.56
Taiwan	.58	.66	.47	.39	.56	.49
Singapore	2.42	2.55	1.18	2.01	2.22	2.18
Thailand	1.01	1.05	1.13	.78	.55	.65
Malaysia	1.14	2.08	2.77	2.15	1.76	1.83
Philippines	.23	.28	.12	.53	.64	.47
Indonesia	.47	.77	.95	.86	.85	1.42
China	1.51	2.27	5.97	11.82	13.66	11.89
Latin America	2.59	4.59	5.19	4.29	6.64	4.67

Source of Raw Data: Jetro White Paper on FDI, 1997

V. Exports and China

In January 1994, Mainland China devalued its currency about 40% to stem its trade deficit. Intentional or otherwise, this translated into a loss of competitiveness of the Asean currencies. Indeed, China reversed the trade deficit in 1995 and 1996. How the Asean currencies have fared relative to the Chinese currencies is shown by the real exchange rate. It plots the real exchange rate (E_i/P_i) for each country where E_i is the nominal exchange rate, P_i the consumer's price index with base year 1990. Fig.1 plots the result for the period 1990-1998. (as in De Dios, et al., 1997)

Since 1990 is the base year, 1990=100. This means that a currency that stays at 100 in subsequent years retains (maintains) its competitiveness relative to 1990. Since we have estimates for the Asean economies, we can also compare competitiveness relative to neigbouring currencies. That is, if the dollar's real exchange rate against the peso is below that against the rupiah, the peso lost competitiveness against the rupiah for that year. With these as premises, these observations are warranted from Figure 1.

(i) In the period 1990-96, the Philippine peso has lost the most competitiveness relative to 1990.
(ii) In the same period, the Philippine peso has lost competitiveness to every currency in the Asean and China.
(iii) Mainland China has the best record at retaining competitiveness relative to 1990.
(iv) Mainland China has gained competitiveness relative to all currencies in the Asean.
(v) The currency crisis allowed the Asean currencies to catch-up with China.

A. Export Share

The result of the Chinese leadership's mercantilistic tendencies is apparent in China's growing share in world export. Table 5 shows the export shares of China, the Asean and selected East Asian, Southern Asian and Latin American countries from 1990 to 1995. China's share moved from 1.79% to 3.00% or a growth of 61% in 5 years. Only Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand exceeded this share growth. The Philippines 42% growth in share is impressive thanks to Japanese and other DFI's. The Asean share grew 52% over the period from 4.11 to 6.24%. These is here no indication that China's share growth was at the expense of the either the Asean or other regions.

Table 5. Export share in world export, 1990-1995

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Growth rate, 95-90 (%)
China	1.86	2.06	2.28	2.46	2.88	3.00	61.2
Indonesia	0.76	0.84	0.91	0.99	0.91	0.87	14.5
Malaysia	0.87	0.99	1.08	1.27	1.40	1.49	71.2
Philippines	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.30	0.32	0.35	42.0
Singapore	1.56	1.70	1.69	1.99	2.30	2.38	47.4
Thailand	0.68	0.83	0.87	1.00	1.10	1.14	61.7
Korea	1.92	2.06	2.04	2.20	2.29	2.53	32.0
India	0.53	0.51	0.49	0.54	0.58	0.62	17.0
Hongkong	2.43	2.83	3.19	3.63	3.61	3.50	44.0
Taiwan	1.97	2.19	2.17	2.28	2.23	2.26	14.7
Mexico	0.80	0.77	1.24	1.40	1.45	1.61	101.2
ASEAN 5	4.11	4.60	4.81	5.55	6.03	6.24	52.0

B. Growth of Exports

Table 5 gives the growth of exports by region and by years. Note first the unmistakable world export trade slowdown in 1996. World exports growth fell from an annual average of 7.5% from 1990-95 to just 4% in 1996. The export growth of Asia as a whole fell from 11.5% per year from 1990-1995 to 1% in 1996. The export growth of the Six East Asian Traders fell from 13.5% average in 1995 to 3% in 1996. But China's export growth also fell from an annual average of 18.4% in 1990-95 to 1.5% in 1996. China's export moved in lockstep with East Asia. There is no indication that China is eating East Asia's lunch in the world export market.

1996 is a curious year for two reasons. For the first time, Asia's and the Six East Asian Traders' export growth fell below world average growth (3% vs. 4%) while Africa and Middle East did better than world average and even their 1990-95 average. This means that the fall in world exports growth concentrated on Asia's and East Asia's exports -- mainly microchips and electronics while it hardly touched primary commodity exports. The other curious thing in 1996 is that Latin America with 11.5% growth and especially Mexico with 20.5% growth did exceptionally well even relative to their average from 1990-95. If there was anybody east East Asia's lunch in 1996, it was Latin America and Mexico.

Table 6. Export Growth by Region, FOB Value (in percent)

Region	1996	1990-95 (Average)
World	4.0	7.5
Asia	1.0	11.5
Japan	–7.0	8.2
China	1.5	18.4
Six East Asian's *	3.0	13.5
Latin America	11.5	9.2
Mexico	20.5	14.1
Africa	8.5	0.33
North America	6.5	8.25

Note: *Hongkong, S. Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia.

Source: WTO ***Focus***, 18, April 1997.

C. China's Trade Balance with East Asia

Another way to gauge China's impact on East Asia is through its trade balance with these countries. Table 7 gives the trade balance of China from 1990-1995. Concentrating on the entries for 1995, we see that with Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan, China had a trade deficit. It had trade surpluses with Philippines, Singapore,

Thailand and Hongkong. This demonstrates an interesting pattern. With resource-rich countries Indonesia and Malaysia, China imports primary commodities and raw materials (largely petroleum, mineral and forest products). From more advanced NIC, China heavily imports capital and intermediate inputs. Hongkong is China's principal transshipment port so with Hongkong it had a huge trade surplus. The rest (Philippines, Thailand, Singapore) are export markets. Thus, China behaves in Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson categories as an economy with endowments intermediate between resource rich economies (Indonesia and Malaysia) and capital-rich economies (S. Korea and Taiwan). It has abundant labor.

This is precisely where S. Korea and Taiwan located themselves relative to resource-rich Malaysia and Indonesia and the developed countries.

Had China not been in the picture, the role of intermediary may be being played by one or two of the Asean countries. This is a cause for concern.

The flying-geese theory views countries as graduating from a set of farm goods to a set of labor-intensive goods to another more capital-intensive to yet another more technology-intensive as the wage rate rises. The Developed Countries relegated light manufactured exports to Japan which relegated it to Singapore, Taiwan and S. Korea which would have passed it on to labor-abundant Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. This was happening throughout the 80's but in the 90's this low end mantle is suddenly being contested and successfully wrested by China. All over the world, cheap light manufactures originating from the Asean are being supplanted by those from China. The exception is Japan's market where cheap electronics are from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand thanks to considerable Japanese DFI's in the countries. Thus, the flying-geese pattern is being disrupted. Since East Asia is varied and even the Asean is varied, the effect of China on East Asia depends upon the structure and state of development of each country.

Table 7. China's Trade Balance with East Asian Countries: 1990-1995

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Indonesia (Asean)	(448)	(922)	(1,083)	(753)	(537)	(615)
Malaysia (Asean)	(482)	(276)	(185)	(380)	(505)	(784)
Philippines (Asean)	115	123	54	68	204	754
Singapore (Asean)	1,167	951	793	(402)	82	102
Thailand (Asean)	468	426	470	149	295	141
Korea (NIC)	197	1,113	(185)	(2,500)	(2,942)	(3,600)
Hongkong	12,598	14,595	16,972	11,566	22,877	27,404
Taiwan	(1,934)	(3,044)	(5,193)	(11,473)	(11,842)	(11,690)

Source: World Trade Statistics, 1996

VI. China and Philippines

This Philippines is one of those East Asian countries that are neither resource-rich (as Indonesia and Malaysia) nor know how or capital-rich (Taiwan and S. Korea), the both of which represent source countries (i.e., for raw materials and intermediate inputs, respectively) for China's factories. The Philippines trade with China reflects the Philippines position as export destination of products made in China.

Table 8 gives the trade balance in US$ of the Philippines with China by product categories. Since 1993, the trade deficit has been on the rise and by the 3rd quarter of 1997 may have already exceeded half a billion dollars. Fig.2 gives the trajectory of exports and imports to 1996. By product categories, the largest deficit is registered for "industrial manufactures" ($321.3m) followed by "consumer durable" ($45.8m) and then "resource based products" ($7.7m). Only in "special transactions" is a consistent surplus registered ($20.8 m).

Under "consumer manufactures" we had shortfalls on all categories with largest, apart from "others," in "gifts, toys and houseware" ($14.2m) which is apparent in our department stores. Under "industrial manufactures" we had surpluses only in "metal manufactures" ($11.4m) and "petroleum products" ($17.0m). By contrast, huge deficits were registered for Electronics ($81.7m), Chemicals ($73.3m) and "machinery and transport equipment" ($49.8m).

"Resource-based Products" used to be a surplus item for the Philippines but this has reversed. Our surpluses here comes from "Coconut Products," "Mineral Products" and "Forest Products," all traditional exports. We have a deficit even in "Tobacco." Under "Food and Food Preps" we have a deficit in "Processed Foods" but a surplus in "Fresh Food."

What this pattern suggests is that China even while its per capita income is lower than the Philippines is behaving as the more advanced economy exporting manufactures and importing primary commodities and raw materials. Although I do not have the data, I hypothesize the same to be happening to Thailand. The trade pattern of Indonesia and Malaysia will exhibit the same broad pattern except that the commodity and raw material exports of these countries (petroleum, forest and mineral products) to China dominate their imports of machinery and manufactures.

Summary

Did China eat East Asia's lunch? If the question is asked in the context of a principal explanation for the East Asian crisis, the answer is hardly. The China factor was partly to blame for the growing trade deficit in the Asean but this could not by itself have delivered the collapse. Like the Krugman-Young "East Asian miracle myth," the China factor has incremental and long-term effect. Furthermore, the emergence of Mainland China promises differential impacts on the East Asian area. Those countries with complementary endowments and capacities like Taiwan and South Korea in industrial raw materials and Malaysia and Indonesia with complementary primary products will be invited to China's table. The Philippines is the worst place economy in the Asean to cope with the "substitutive Great Dragoon effect" of China.

The paper starts with characterizing Mainland China as a strong state with mercatilistic tendencies and with vast endowments dwarfing those of the Asean. It is therefore bound to force those a bit ahead of itself to slow down especially those in competing posture. While the "complementary Great Dragon Effect" pulled the Asean along with itself in its fateful catch-up drive, the "Great Dragon Effect" of China is substitutive for some countries. We detailed how China has or garnered enormous share of DFI's both in the world and in East Asia. In world export share, although China's export share grew from 1.79% to 3%, the Asean's share also grew. If at all, China is wresting share from other LDC's but not the Asean. In terms of export growth, China's moved in lock-step with the East Asia. Thus, there is no indication here that Asean is losing out to China.

China's trade balance with East Asia tells clearly the factor endowments story of trade. Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea all enjoyed a trade surplus against China. The Philippines and Thailand experience a trade deficit. This shows that with the former countries, the "Great Dragon Effect" of China is complementary but it is substitutive for the latter. Finally, the Philippines is experiencing rising deficit against China in "industrial manufactures," "consumer durables" and even in "re-source-based products."

Table 8. Philippine-China Trade Balance (Annual) (FOB Value in US Dollars)

Product Group	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	Total
Total	(95,729,631)	(69,849,965)	(6,788,771)	(129,784,763)	(364,652,820)	(348,585,058)	(1,015,391,008)
Consumer Manufactures	(4,752,027)	(9,333,393)	(11,709,094)	(17,795,505)	(26,214,381)	(45,855,947)	(115,660,347)
Garments	(370,688)	(763,230)	(372,588)	(516,883)	(308,565)	(1,384,647)	(3,716,601)
Gifts, Toys and Hardware	(1,498,001)	(2,677,553)	(4,237,450)	(4,990,260)	(7,859,409)	(14,237,245)	(35,499,918)
Fashion Accessories and Leather Goods	(93,038)	(44,643)	(579,925)	(202,328)	(780,014)	(743,328)	(2,443,276)
Furniture	(30,295)	(42,151)	(48,695)	(331,901)	(396,466)	(616,613)	(1,466,121)
Footwear	(131,321)	(269,798)	(491,402)	(1,491,730)	(2,781,671)	(6,838,646)	(12,004,568)
Other Consumer Manufactures	(2,628,684)	(5,536,018)	(5,979,034)	(10,262,403)	(14,088,256)	(22,035,468)	(60,529,863)
Food and Food Preparations	(33,309,125)	(14,535,030)	(12,090,443)	(25,258,716)	(17,861,578)	5,479,988	(97,574,904)
Processed foods	(32,526,678)	(15,237,800)	(11,706,019)	(20,742,994)	(29,179,736)	(22,286,900)	(131,680,127)
Fresh foods	(782,447)	702,770	(384,424)	(4,515,722)	11,318,158	27,755,888	34,105,223
Resource-based Products	6,680,265	7,647,416	1,723,431	(22,536,087)	(14,591,551)	(7,758,514)	(28,835,040)
Coconut products	4,962,145	2,419,250	1,574,000	3,346,000	8,529,375	7,028,386	27,859,156
Forest products	(21,924)	28,963	6,337	42,667	(15,039)	10,193,658	10,234,662
Tobacco	(305,061)	(1,023,037)	(148,594)	(9,087,890)	(6,547,975)	(6,093,104)	(23,205,661)
Mineral products	10,445,732	8,550,317	4,168,319	3,416,066	18,375,686	11,353,576	56,309,696
Other resource-based commodities	(8,400,627)	(2,328,077)	(3,876,631)	(20,252,930)	(34,933,598)	(30,241,030)	(100,032,893)
Industrial manufactures	(62,270,874)	(53,319,959)	14,304,434	(68,676,283)	(310,387,522)	(321,314,822)	(801,665,026)
Electronics	(7,619,553)	(11,032,549)	(7,563,595)	(21,125,516)	(42,404,889)	(81,780,885)	(171,526,987)
Construction materials	(1,443,719)	(11,537,876)	(3,415,209)	(5,870,324)	(42,343,056)	(40,435,600)	(105,045,784)
Metal manufactures	20,089,429	35,201,301	53,854,923	9,280,132	(82,197,520)	11,451,777	47,680,042
Chemicals	50,776,943	10,286,196	(12,900,155)	(52,454,622)	(75,922,657)	(73,323,686)	(153,557,981)
Machinery and transport equipment	(7,598,337)	(9,672,716)	(18,636,942)	(19,628,035)	(44,224,549)	(49,799,834)	(149,560,413)
Textile yarns and fabrics	(37,890,964)	(29,134,781)	(22,511,578)	(31,198,647)	(59,500,402)	(49,799,347)	(230,015,719)
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	(252,168)	(1,785,776)	(1,154,352)	(1,521,843)	(5,226,154)	(22,152,019)	(32,092,312)
Petroleum products	(70,388,440)	(20,213,738)	32,994,817	65,086,706	70,970,712	17,075,923	95,525,980
Other industrial manufactures	(7,944,065)	(15,410,020)	(6,363,475)	(11,244,134)	(29,539,007)	(32,571,151)	(103,071,852)
Special transactions	(2,077,870)	(308,999)	982,901	4,481,828	4,402,212	20,864,237	28,344,309

References

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